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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-3410 
____________ 
 
MARK ANTHONY ROBINSON, 
 
      Appellant 
v. 
 
JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary, DOC; 
DORINA VARNER, Chief Grievance Officer 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-01269) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 24, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and 1SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 3, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
 
                                              
1 The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter participated in the decision in this case.  Judge Sloviter 
assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016 after the submission date, but before the filing of the 
opinion.  This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third 
Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Mark Anthony Robinson appeals from an order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to the defendants.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm. 
 Robinson filed an in forma pauperis civil rights action in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Department of Corrections 
(“DOC”) Secretary John Wetzel and Chief Grievance Officer Dorina Varner.  Robinson, 
a Level 5 inmate (Level 5 involves the highest level of security and control), alleged that 
the DOC’s policies restricting Level 5 inmates’ access to religious materials were “clear 
RLUIPA [Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act] and other U.S. and 
Pennsylvania constitutional violations.”  Complaint, at 1.  Robinson, a Christian, alleged 
that he could not receive communion regularly and that his ability to receive written 
religious materials was “spotty.”  Id. at 2.  Robinson sought damages and injunctive 
relief.  He moved for class certification, appointment of counsel, and preliminary 
injunctive relief.  Those motions were denied by the District Court. 
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing, 
in pertinent part, that Robinson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to 
filing suit, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  The defendants acknowledged that 
Robinson had pursued two grievances while incarcerated at the State Correctional 
Institution in Bellefonte (“SCI-Rockview”) – Grievance Nos. 358669 & 359361 – but 
argued that the exhaustion process was not complete without a final written appeal to the 
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”).  SOIGA received a 
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letter from Robinson titled “Declaration,” which it construed as an appeal of Grievance 
Nos. 359361 and 358669, but it had issued a Final Appeal Decision dismissing those 
grievances because Robinson had failed to provide the required documentation for proper 
review, namely, copies of his grievances and the Initial Review Responses as required by 
DC-ADM 804.1  
 The District Court converted the defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment 
and set a deadline for Robinson to respond.  Briefing on this motion ensued, and 
following briefing, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation, 
recommending that the defendants’ motion be granted.  The Magistrate Judge concluded, 
in pertinent part, that Robinson had failed to rebut the defendants’ carefully documented 
assertion that he had failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies.  Robinson sought 
and received an extension of time to file Objections, but then he filed a motion for leave 
to amend, and a proposed amended complaint.  The Magistrate Judge granted leave to 
amend, deemed the proposed amended complaint filed, and denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss as moot.  The District Court then rejected as moot the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation in light of Robinson’s decision to amend his 
complaint. 
                                              
1 In Grievance No. 358669, Robinson complained that while in the Restricted Housing 
Unit (“RHU”) he was prohibited from practicing his religion, specifically that he was not 
able to attend church services, Bible studies, or other Christian activities or events.  
Robinson sought as relief an order directing that SCI-Rockview provide inmates within 
the RHU access to closed-circuit video of church services and Bible studies, among other 
things.  In Grievance No. 359361, Robinson alleged that he was prohibited from ordering 
and receiving religious books with money from his inmate account, among other things. 
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 In his amended complaint, Robinson alleged that the defendants violated his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by enforcing policies which had the effect of 
interfering with his right to practice his Christian religion.  Robinson asserted that, while 
in Level 5 custody at SCI-Rockview, he had made “repeated and consistent” requests “to 
Rockview’s Superintendent” to be allowed to “view by close[d]-circuit television: church 
services, lessons, Bible studies and other religious programming,” Amended Complaint, 
at ¶15, and been told that he could not do so because of DOC policy.  He further provided 
an explanation for his failure to include the proper documentation in support of his 
appeals to SOIGA and argued that his procedural default of his administrative remedies 
should be excused, id. at ¶¶ 17-33.  Last, he asserted that he had made the same 
continuous requests to view religious programming on closed-circuit television in the 
RHU at his new facility, SCI-Camp Hill, id. at ¶ 34-41, but those requests had been 
denied, again on the basis of DOC policy.   
 The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.  Again the defendants 
argued that Robinson had failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies with respect 
to his SCI-Rockview grievances, and thus his amended complaint should be dismissed to 
the extent of those grievances.  The defendants also noted that Robinson had been 
transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”), and that 
he had submitted Grievance No. 389422 within that institution’s grievance system.2  The 
                                              
2 In Grievance No. 389422, Robinson complained that a Protestant Chaplain was not 
making weekly rounds; that he did not have access to Christian literature; that he was not 
receiving communion; and that he should be permitted to view religious services via 
video monitor.  In denying the grievance, the Reverend O. Larry Mills said that a 
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defendants did not contest that Robinson had appealed his administrative remedies with 
respect to Grievance No. 389422 to the highest level, but argued that the amended 
complaint should nevertheless be dismissed as to Secretary Wetzel for failure to exhaust 
because Robinson failed to identify Wetzel as an individual directly involved in the 
events, as required by DC-ADM 804(1)(A)(11).  The defendants did not contest the 
exhaustion issue with respect to Varner; instead, they argued that she had no personal 
involvement in the alleged denial of access to religious services.  They argued that her 
participation in an “after-the fact” review of the denial of Robinson’s grievance was not 
enough to deem her personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation under 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d. Cir. 1988). 
 After Robinson submitted his opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss his 
amended complaint, the Magistrate Judge filed another Report and Recommendation, this 
time recommending that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.  The Magistrate 
Judge credited Robinson’s argument, for purposes of summary judgment, that he should 
not be faulted for having taken a final-level appeal of two of his grievances without the 
required documentation, and rejected the defendants’ argument that Robinson had failed 
to properly exhaust remedies with respect to his most recent grievance by neglecting to 
                                                                                                                                                  
chaplain was indeed making the required weekly rounds to the Special Management Unit; 
that chaplains do indeed bring materials to the block when requested; that communion is 
available and that Robinson need only request it; and that, with respect to video 
broadcasts, the least restrictive means to accommodate Robinson’s faith was through 
publications, which Robinson could purchase in accordance with DOC policy.  On 
appeal, Chief Grievance Officer Varner concluded that Robinson’s grievance was 
frivolous, in part because there was no evidence that he had actually ever requested any 
religious materials. 
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specifically identify Wetzel as the individual directly involved.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the case proceed as to defendant Wetzel, but agreed with the 
defendants that defendant Varner’s action in dismissing Robinson’s grievance appeal was 
insufficient to show direct involvement in any First Amendment violation.  In an order 
filed on January 15, 2014, the District Court dismissed the amended complaint as to 
Varner and denied it as to Wetzel.  Discovery ensued. 
 Following discovery, both Robinson and Wetzel moved for summary judgment, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), each contending that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Defendant Wetzel noted in his summary judgment motion that Robinson was now 
incarcerated in the Restricted Housing Unit at the State Correctional Institution in 
Waynesburg, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Greene”).  The Magistrate Judge recommended that 
Robinson’s motion be denied, and the District Court denied it on March 30, 2015.  The 
Magistrate Judge then recommended that Wetzel’s summary judgment motion be 
granted.  Drawing on information gleaned from another of Robinson’s civil rights 
actions, Robinson v. Wetzel, D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-02194, the Magistrate Judge described 
Robinson’s institutional behavior as “incorrigible” and “antisocial.”  The Magistrate 
Judge noted that, for inmates in Level 5 custody, in-cell television is a privilege that can 
be denied or revoked based on that inmate’s conduct, which in Robinson’s case was not 
good.  The Magistrate Judge also described televisions as “potential weapons,” and noted 
that, in another of Robinson’s cases, Robinson v. Tennis, D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-00272, he 
(the Magistrate Judge) had found that Robinson was videotaped refusing to return to A-
Block; in the videotape Robinson could clearly be seen tying the electrical cord of a 
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television set around his neck and threatening to harm himself and throw the television.  
The Magistrate Judge noted that Robinson owned a television but was not permitted to 
have it in his cell due to his poor conduct. 
 With respect to Robinson’s specific First Amendment allegations, the Magistrate 
Judge concluded that the DOC’s regulations regarding television for Level 5 inmates was 
valid because it was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, citing Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  In 
Robinson’s case in particular, he had not earned the privilege of watching television, and 
his disciplinary history actually showed his ability to use a television as a weapon.  
Moreover, Robinson had alternative means of exercising his First Amendment right to 
practice his Christian religion.  Specifically, the summary judgment record showed that, 
although inmates housed in Level 5 housing units are not permitted to attend religious 
services and programs that take place within the general population, religious services 
and programs for inmates housed in level 5 tale place in the inmate’s cell through visits 
from staff chaplains.  Those chaplains may provide Level 5 inmates with religious 
materials.  Inmates in Level 5 housing may pray in their cells, and they may also 
designate a Religious Advisor, and then are permitted to correspond with and receive 
visits from that person.  Inmates may also submit a Religious Accommodation 
Request Form regarding any religious need, and it will be given consideration by the 
institution.  The Magistrate Judge noted that Robinson had never submitted an Inmate 
Religious Accommodation Request Form regarding any religious issue while 
incarcerated at SCI-Rockview, SCI-Camp Hill, or SCI-Greene. 
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 Robinson submitted Objections to the Report and Recommendation.  He argued 
that the Magistrate Judge had misconstrued his claim as a demand for a television in his 
cell; that the Magistrate Judge had not taken into account that at his new facility, SCI-
Greene, there are televisions on each pod in the RHU but officials there “refuse to make 
religious service the viewing priority;” and that the Magistrate Judge’s comments 
concerning his conduct and criminal history were inflammatory, irrelevant, and/or 
inaccurate.  In an order entered on September 21, 2016, the District Court adopted the 
Report and Recommendation, concluding that, on the undisputed facts of the case, the 
Magistrate Judge had correctly applied Turner’s four-factor analysis to Robinson’s First 
Amendment claim.  Robinson’s objections were overruled and summary judgment was 
granted to defendant Wetzel. 
 Robinson appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk 
granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was 
subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary action under 
Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit argument in writing, and 
in his written submission in support of his appeal, Robinson makes the same arguments 
he made in his Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, 
including his argument that the DOC has installed televisions inside of each RHU pod at 
SCI-Greene.  Robinson has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.       
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Summary 
judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved and the 
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each 
defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing.  Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.  
See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976); Chincello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 
126, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986).  Robinson’s amended complaint fails to allege any action that 
would be adequate to demonstrate personal involvement on the part of Varner.  Although 
the amended complaint alleges that Varner responded inappropriately in reviewing on 
appeal his grievance that he had been denied the right to practice his religion, this 
allegation does not establish Varner’s direct involvement in the denial of Robinson’s 
request to view religious services on closed circuit television. 
 Turning to Robinson’s First Amendment claim against defendant Wetzel, we note 
that “[i]nmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its 
directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”  O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted).  However, an inmate only “retains 
those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or 
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”  Pell, 417 U.S. at 
822.  To determine whether a regulation infringing upon constitutional rights is 
reasonable, courts apply the four factors set forth in Turner.  These factors require courts 
to consider: (1) whether the regulation bears a valid, rational connection to a legitimate 
and neutral government objective; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising 
the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) the impact accommodation of the 
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation 
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of prison resources generally; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives.  Id. at 89-90 
(citations omitted).  See also Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 513-14 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 We have carefully reviewed the summary judgment record and are satisfied that 
the Turner factors were properly applied to the claims Robinson exhausted through the 
prison grievance process.  The defendants established through their summary judgment 
motion that defendant Wetzel has not substantially burdened the exercise of Robinson’s 
religion by refusing to allow him access to religious television programming while in 
Level 5 housing.  Defendant Wetzel asserted in his summary judgment motion that 
videotaping of religious services for major faith groups takes place at SCI-Camp Hill and 
SCI-Greene.  These services are broadcast on the institutional channel, and inmates in the 
general population at these institutions are permitted to view these services on their 
televisions.  Although inmates in Level 5 housing are not similarly accommodated, they 
receive visits from staff chaplains, they may receive communion, they may keep written 
religious materials in their cells, they may correspond with and receive visits from 
religious advisors within the community, and they have an avenue for seeking additional 
accommodations.  The Turner analysis does not focus on whether the inmate has 
alternative means of engaging in a particular practice; rather, it focuses on whether 
he has alternative means of observing his religion generally.  See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 
351-52.  Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendant Wetzel on Robinson’s 
First Amendment claim was proper. 
 We emphasize that our decision to summarily affirm is necessarily limited.  
Robinson pursued only a First Amendment claim in his amended complaint. 
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 In addition, only the issues Robinson exhausted through the grievances filed at 
SCI-Rockview and SCI-Camp Hill are at issue here.  In his response in opposition to the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, see Docket Entry Nos. 127 & 130; 
Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation; and written argument 
on appeal, Robinson alleged that officials at SCI-Greene had recently installed television 
monitors in the Restricted Housing Unit blocks and pods.  He appears to argue that, 
therefore, allowing Level 5 inmates to view religious programming on these already-
installed monitors would permit Christian inmates to practice their religion without at the 
same time unduly inconveniencing other inmates or causing security concerns.  If 
conditions are significantly different at SCI-Greene, as Robinson appears to allege, he is 
not precluded by our affirmance from submitting an accommodation request and/or 
grievance at that institution regarding his expressed need to view religious programming. 
   For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the orders of the District 
Court granting summary judgment to the defendants.  The motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied as moot. 
